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Olga Gadyatskaya1, René Rydhof Hansen2, Kim Guldstrand Larsen2, Axel
Legay3, Mads Chr. Olesen2, and Danny Bøgsted Poulsen2,
1 SnT, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
2 Department of Computer Science, Aalborg University, Denmark
3 INRIA Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique, France
Abstract. Performing a thorough security risk assessment of an organi-
sation has always been challenging, but with the increased reliance on
outsourced and off-site third-party services, i.e., “cloud services”, com-
bined with internal (legacy) IT-infrastructure and -services, it has become
a very difficult and time-consuming task. One of the traditional tools
available to ease the burden of performing a security risk assessment
and structure security analyses in general is attack trees [19, 23, 24], a
tree-based formalism inspired by fault trees, a well-known formalism used
in safety engineering.
In this paper we study an extension of traditional attack trees, called
attack-defense trees, in which not only the attacker’s actions are modelled,
but also the defensive actions taken by the attacked party [15]. In this
work we use the attack-defense tree as a goal an attacker wants to
achieve, and separate the behaviour of the attacker and defender from
the attack-defense-tree. We give a fully stochastic timed semantics for
the behaviour of the attacker by introducing attacker profiles that choose
actions probabilistically and execute these according to a probability
density. Lastly, the stochastic semantics provides success probabilitites
for individual actions. Furthermore, we show how to introduce costs of
attacker actions. Finally, we show how to automatically encode it all
with a network of timed automata, an encoding that enables us to apply
state-of-the-art model checking tools and techniques to perform fully
automated quantitative and qualitative analyses of the modelled system.
1 Introduction
In the past few years, we have witnessed a rapid increase in the number and
severity of security breaches, ranging from theft of personal information about
millions of US government employees1 to sophisticated targeted malware attacks
on security vendors2. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that it has become
? Research leading to these results was partially supported by the European Union
Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement no. 318003 (TREsPASS).
1 https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/
2 http://usa.kaspersky.com/about-us/press-center/press-releases/
duqu-back-kaspersky-lab-reveals-cyberattack-its-corporate-netwo
difficult to perform an adequate risk assessment of an organisation’s security
stance, with many organisations relying on a complex mix of off-site third party
IT-services, e.g., “cloud services” and internally supported IT services. One of the
tools available to help structure risk assessments and security analyses is attack
trees, recommended, e.g., by NATO Research and Technology Organisation (RTO)
[20] and OWASP [22]. Attack trees [19, 23, 24] is a tree based formalism inspired
by fault trees, a well-known formalism used in safety engineering. The formalism
was initially introduced by Schneier [24] and given a formal definition by Mauw
and Oostdijk [19]. Kordy et al. [16] provide a survey on attack trees and related
formalisms. While basic quantitative analysis, i.e., a bottom-up computation
for a single parameter (e.g., cost, probability or time of an attack), can be
performed directly on attack trees [4], several proposals exist to extend the basic
attack tree formalism in order to support better analysis. For example, Buldas
et al. [6], Jürgenson and Willemson [14] introduced multi-parameter attack trees
with interdependent variables; Dalton et al. [7] have proposed analysing attack
trees as Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets; Arnold et al. [2] applied interactive
Input/Output Markov Chains to enhance temporal and stochastic dependencies
analysis in attack trees. Kumar et al. [17] have considered priced timed automata
for analysis of attack trees. This work defines a translation for each leaf node
and each gate in an attack tree into a priced timed automaton. The approach
allows to translate the full attack tree into an automaton that can be analysed
using the uppaal Cora model checker. The research community interest in
attack trees has been recently reinvigorated by new techniques to automatically
generate attack trees and attack-defense trees from socio-technical organizational
models [11, 13], paving the way towards automating risk assessment.
Attack-defense trees are a notable extension of attack trees that include,
besides attacker’s actions, also defender’s actions and model their interplay
[3, 15]. This extended formalism allows capturing more detailed scenarios, and
incorporating the defender’s perspective into an analysis. For example, burglar-
resistance classes for physical security mechanisms, such as doors and windows,
define how much time an attacker equipped with certain tools needs to spend on
the intrusion [25]. Explicit consideration of defenses in the analysis allows the
domain experts to get a better picture of the scenario [4, 15]. Recently, Hermanns
et al. [12] have created the attack-defense-diagrams formalism extending attacke-
defense trees with trigger and reset gates, which allow expressing temporal
behaviours. The work [21] likewise introduces a sequential gate to attack-defense
trees and considers a two-player stochastic game interpretation of this.
Our paper introduces a framework for analysing complex temporal scenarios of
interactions of attackers and defenders, beyond the expressiveness of classic attack-
defense trees. For doing this we develop a modelling framework for expressing
the temporal behaviour of the attacker with the formalism networks of timed
automata. Unlike the work of [17] the attack-defense-tree is not encoded as a timed
automata - instead it is encoded as a boolean formula, which the attacker wishes
to become true. This encoding allows us to apply state-of-the-art model checking
tools and techniques to perform fully automated analyses of the modelled system,
both qualitative (boolean) analysis and quantitative (probabilistic) analysis. The
modelling framework is accompanied by an automatic translation script. The
script reads an attack-defense-tree and outputs a uppaal [18] timed automata
model which can subsequently be queried several questions: among these questions
are “what is the probability that an attack succeeds within τ” and “what is the
expected cost of the attacker within τ time units” for a specific behaviour of the
attacker. Using Uppaal-Stratego [10], a recent extension of uppaal, we are
furthermore capable of finding an attacker that minimises the expected cost of
an attack.
2 Attack Defense Trees
We will now define an attack-defense tree (Definition 1), along with the standard
boolean semantics for such a tree. Thereafter a temporal semantics with time, cost
and stochasticity is introduced. This temporal semantics is the first contribution
of this paper.
Definition 1 (AD-tree). An AD-tree over the attacker actions Aaand defender
actions Ad is generated by the syntax
t :== p | t ∧ t | t ∨ t |∼ t
where p ∈ Aa ∪ Ad. We denote by L(Aa, Ad) all AD-trees over Aa and Ad.
Let t ∈ L(Aa, Ad), let A ⊆ Aa be the set of selected attacker actins and let D ⊆ Ad
be the set of selected defender actions; then we inductively define JtKA,D as
– JpKD,A = tt if p ∈ A ∪D, ff otherwise
– Jt1 ∧ t2KD,A = (Jt1KD,A) ∧ (Jt2KD,A)
– Jt1 ∨ t2KD,A = (Jt1KD,A) ∨ (Jt2KD,A)
– J∼ tKD,A = ¬(JtKD,A)
As an example of an attack-defense-tree consider Fig. 1. This tree explains
how an attacker may succefully remove an RFID-tag from a warehouse. Among
the possible ways is infiltrating management and order a replacement tag. The
example is lifted from [3].
To make attack-defense-trees well-formed, we follow Aslanyan and Nielson [3]
and impose a type system on top of the abstract syntax of Definition 1 – in this
system there are two types d and a corresponding to defender and attacker. The
type system is captured in Fig. 2. The negation operator ∼ acts like the switch
operator of Aslanyan and Nielson [3] and changes the type of the subtree. Unlike
Aslanyan and Nielson, we do not have a normal negation operator: the reason
is we only want an attacker (or defender for that matter) to do positive things
i.e. the attacker should only do something beneficial for him. In the remainder
we only consider well-formed trees according to this type-system and we restrict
our attention to trees t where t ` a. The major interest of attack-defense trees
is whether there exists a set of defense measures such that an attack can never
occur.
Fig. 1: An example of an attack-defense-tree. Square items correspond to de-
fender’s actions and circles to the attacker.
Question 1. For an attack-defense tree t ∈ L(Aa, Ad), does there exist D ⊆ Ad,
such that for all A ⊆ Aa, JtKD,A = ff?
This encapsulates our view that defense measures are selected ahead of time
and fixed, while the attacker selects a set of attack measures. Our view is in
accordance with the classical definition of attack-defense trees by [15]. Let λ be
a symbol not in Aa, which indicates that an attacker chooses to do no actions.
We denote by Aλa the set Aa ∪ {λ}.
Definition 2. Let t ∈ L(Aa, Ad) be an AD-tree. The Attack-Defense-Graph over
t is the tuple Gt = (V, v0,→,→¬, 99K,F ) where
Ad, Aa ` p : a
, p ∈ Aa
Ad, Aa ` p : d
, p ∈ Ad
Ad, Aa ` t1 : r Ad, Aa ` t2 : r
Ad, Aa ` t1 ∧ t2 : r
Ad, Aa ` t1 : r Ad, Aa ` t2 : r
Ad, Aa ` t1 ∨ t2 : r
Ad, Aa ` t1 : r
Ad, Aa `∼ t1 : r−1
, r−1 =
{
a if r = d
d if r = a
Fig. 2: Type system to make attack-defense trees well-formed
– V = 2Ad × 2Aa is a set of vertices containing currently true attacker and
defender actions,
– v0 = (∅, ∅) is the initial vertex,
– →⊆ (V × Aλa ×V) is a set of edges where ((D,A), a, (D′,A′)) ∈→ if and only
if D = D′, A′ = A ∪ ({a} ∩ Aa) and a /∈ A,
– →¬⊆ (V × Aa × V) is a set of edges where ((D,A), a, (D,A)) ∈→¬ if and
only if a /∈ A
– 99K= {(v0,D,S) | D ∈ 2Ad ∧ S = (D, ∅)} is the “select defense” edges and
– F = {(D,A) ∈ V | JtKD,A = tt} is a set of final vertices.
An attack-defense graph is essentially laying out all the possible steps an attacker
may take to achieve a successful attack. Notice the edges in →¬ correspond to
trying to execute an atomic attack and failing. We allow this loop back as in this
way we are able to model an attacker who selects what action to perform and an
environment deciding whether that action succeeds.
For an attack-defense graph (ADG) Gt = (V, v0,→,→¬, 99K,F ) we write
v
D
99K v′ whenever (v,D, v′) ∈99K and similarly we write v a−→ v′ (v ¬a−−→ v′)
if (v, a, v′) ∈→ ((v, a, v′) ∈→¬). An attack-defense scenario (ADS) for Gt is a
sequence ω = v0Dv1α1v2α2 . . . αn1sn . . . , where v0 = v
0, for all i, αi ∈ {a,¬a |
a ∈ Aa} ∪ {λ}, v0
D
99K v1 and for all j > 0, vj
αj−→ vj+1. We call ω a successful
ADS if there exists j such that vj ∈ F , denoted ω  t, and we call it a failed
ADS if for all j, vj /∈ F , denoted ω 6 t. We denote by Ω(t) all ADSs over t and
furthermore let ΩD(t) = {π = v0 D99K v0
a1−→ · · · | π ∈ Ω(t)} be all the ADSs
initiated by the defender selecting defense measure D.
Lemma 1. Let t ∈ L(Aa, Ad) be an attack-defense-tree and let D ⊆ Ad. If for all
ω ∈ ΩD(t), ω 6 t then for all A ⊆ Aa JtKD,A = ff.
Lemma 2. Let t ∈ L(Aa, Ad) be an attack-defense-tree and let D ⊆ Ad. If there
exists ω ∈ ΩD(t), ω  t then there exists A ⊆ Aa such that JtKD,A = tt.
In reality we wish to analyse the possible attacks after the defender has selected
some defense measures. For this we remove the choice of defense measures from
the ADG to get an attack graph (AG). Let Gt = (V, v0,→,→¬, 99K,F ) be
the ADG for t ∈ L(Aa, Ad); then the AG responding to D ⊆ Ad is the graph
(V , vA,→,→¬,F ) where v0
D
99K vA. We denote this AG by GtD. Due to Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 then question 1 is answerable by a pure reachability check on GtD
for all D ⊆ 2Ad .
2.1 Adding Timed Behaviour
Intuitively speaking, an attacker observes the state of an ADG and choose an
action. The attacker is memoryless and does, for instance, not remember how
many times a specific attack has been attempted. The execution time of an
action pa is given by interval [Lpa ,Upa ], and thus an abstract timed attacker
(Definition 3) is essentially a timed transition system.
Definition 3 (Abstract Timed Attacker). Let t ∈ L(Aa, Ad). An abstract
timed attacker over the ADG Gt = (V, v0,→,→¬, 99K,F ) is a tuple (S,M ,Ac)
where
– S is a set of states,
– M : V → S maps vertices to attacker states, and
– Ac : S→ 2Aλa×R≥0 gives the possible actions and delays for an attacker, with
the requirements that
• if s = M(v) and (pa, r) ∈ Ac(s) then v
pa−→ v′ for some v′,
• if (pa, t) ∈ Ac(s) then Lpa ≤ t ≤ Upa and {(pa, t′)|Lpa ≤ t′ ≤ Upa} ⊆
Ac(s),
• if (λ, t) ∈ Ac(s) then Ac(s) = {(λ, t′) | t′ ∈ R≥0},
• if s = M(v), v = D,A, then (λ, 0) ∈ Ac(s) if and only if v ∈ F or A = Aa
and
• for all s ∈ s, Ac(s) 6= ∅
Let Gt = (V, v0,→a,→¬, 99K,F ) be an ADG and let A = (S,M ,Ac) be an
abstract timed attacker for Gt. For D ⊆ Ad, we denote by GtD|A the transition
system with state space V × S, initial state (vA,M(vA)) and transition relation
defined by the rules
– (v, s)
pa,t−−→ (v′,M(v′)) if (pa, t) ∈ Ac(s) and v
pa−→ v′
– (v, s)
¬pa,t−−−→ (v′,M(v′)) if (pa, t) ∈ Ac(s) and v
¬pa−−→ v′
– (v, s)
λ,t−−→ (v′,M(v′)) if (λ, t) ∈ Ac(s) and v λ−→ v′.
A timed attack over GtD|A, t ∈ L(Aa, Ad) is a sequence v0d0α0, v1d1α1 . . . ,
where v0 = v
A, for all i, di ∈ R≥0, αi ∈ {pa,¬pa | pa ∈ Aa}∪{λ} and there exists
a sequence of states and transitions (v0,M(v0))
α0,d0−−−→ (v1, s1) . . . . We denote
by Ωτ (GtD|A) all timed attacks of GtD|A. Let ω = v0d0α0, v1d1α1 . . . be a timed
attack, then we write ω τ t if there exists i, s.t. JtKv = tt and
∑i−1
i=0 di ≤ τ .
Having introduced time, a defender may consider to not guarantee that an
attack can never occur, but to make it very difficult time-wise i.e. that any
succeeding attack will require more than τ time units - captured by question 2.
Obviously, an attacker wishes to find an attack in response to D ⊆ Ad that
succeeds before τ time units i.e. to answer question 3.
Question 2. For an attack-defense tree t ∈ L(Aa, Ad), abstract timed attacker A
and time limit τ , does there exist a D ⊆ Ad, such that for all ω ∈ Ωτ (GtD|A),
ω 6τ t?
Question 3. For an attack-defense tree t ∈ L(Aa, Ad), abstract timed attacker A,
time limit τ and D ⊆ Ad does there exist ω ∈ Ωτ (GtD|A), such that ω τ t?
2.2 Adding Stochasticity
A stochastic attacker is a tuple AS = (A, γ, {δpa |pa ∈ Aλa}), where A is an attacker
defining allowed behaviour by the stochastic attacker, γ : S→ Aλa → R≥0 assigns
a probability mass to attacker’s actions and for all pa ∈ Aλa ,δpa : S→ R≥0 → R≥0
assigns a density to the execution time of pa. A few requirements are in order
here:
1.
∑
a∈Aλa
γ(s)(a) = 1,
2.
∫
R≥0 δa(s)(t) dt = 1 for all a ∈ A
λ
a ,
3. γ(s)(a) · δa(s)(t) 6= 0 implies (a, t) ∈ Ac(s).
Requirement 1 states that γ(s) must be a probability mass function, 2 requires
that δa(s) is a probability density, and finally the most interesting rule 3 requires
that whenever a probability density is assigned to a pair (a, t) then the attacker
must in fact be able to do those according to the timed semantics. Finally, to
make a complete stochastic semantics we need to resolve the non-determinism
of selecting an outcome of performing an action pa. We assume there is a
static probability of an action succeeding, and thus we assume a probability
mass function γSucc : Aa → {pa,¬pa} →]0, 1[ that assigns success and failure
probabilities to actions with the requirement that any action must have a non-zero
probability of succeeding.
Forming the core of a σ-algebra over timed attacks of GtD|AS , consider the
finite sequence π = v0I0α0v1I1α1 . . . vn, where for all i; αi ∈ {pa,¬pa | pa ∈ Aa},
Ii is an interval with rational end-points and vi ∈ V. The set of runs (cylinder)
of this sequence is
CGtD|AS (π) = {v0d0α0, v1d1α1 . . . vndnαn · · · ∈ Ω
τ (GtD|A) | ∀i < di ∈ Ii}.
The probability of these timed attacks runs from (v, s) are recursively defined
by
F(v,s)(π) = (v0 = v) · γ(s)(c(α)) ·
∫
R≥0
δc(α)(s)(t) dt · γSucc(α)F[(v,s)]α,t(π1),
where π1 = v1d1α1 . . . vndnαn, c(pa) = c(¬pa) = pa and (v, s)
α,t−−→ [(v, s)]α,t and
base case F(v,s)(ε) = 1.
Remark 1. The stochastic semantics above is given for arbitrary time distribu-
tions. For the remainder we will however restrict our attention to stochastic
attacker using only uniform distributions.
Let GtD = (V , vA,→a,→¬,F ) be an AG and letAS = ((S,M ,Ac), γ, {, δpa |pa ∈
Aλa}) then we let FGtD|AS (π) = F(vA,M(vA)(π). With the above in place, the prob-
ability of a succesful attack within a time-bound τ is
PGtD|AS (♦≤τ t) =
∫
ω∈Ωτ (GtD|AS)
({
0 if ω 6τ t
1 if ω τ t
)
dFGtD|AS .
Question 4. Given an attack-defense tree t ∈ L(Aa, Ad), stochastic attacker AS
and time limit τ ; find D∗ = arg minD∈2Ad
(
PGtD|AS (♦τ t)
)
Notice that question 4 has the time bound requirement for how quickly an
attacker must succeed in an attack. If this time bound was not present and we
thus gave an attacker unlimited time, then if a successful attack exists (no matter
how unlikely) it would eventually succeed. This is evidenced by the plot in Fig. 3
with the time limit on the x-axis and the probabilities of an attack on the y-axis.
The dashed line in the figure is the lower bound of the 99% confidence level and
the solid line is the upper bound.
2.3 Adding Cost
Fig. 3: Plot of probabilities of a
successful attack for a uniform at-
tacker.
Considering that an attacker is not only con-
strained by time, but also by his available
resources e.g. money, we want to reflect the
concept of a resource in our modelling. For
this purpose we consider that an attacker
only has one resource and that each action
has an associated cost per attempted exe-
cution. We capture this cost by a function
C : Aλa → R≥0 that assigns the cost to actions
with the requirement that C(λ) = 0.
Let ω = v0d0α0 . . . be a timed attack;
then we define the cost of ω up till step j
as C(ω, j) =
∑j−1
i=0 C(c(αi)), where c(λ) = λ and c(pa) = c(¬pa) = pa, i.e., we
just sum up the individual costs along the attack before the jth step. Now we
can define the expected cost of a stochastic attacker, AS , responding to a set of
defense measures D with a time limit τ
EGtD|AS (C : ♦≤τ t) =
∫
ω∈Ωτ (GtD|AS)
({
C(π, j) if ω 6τ t ∧ j = max{i |
∑i
k=0 dk ≤ τ}
C(π, j) if ω τ t ∧ j = min{i | JtKvi = tt}
)
dFGtD|AS .
Question 5. Given an attack-defense tree t ∈ L(Aa, Ad), stochastic attacker AS ,
time limit τ and D ⊂ Ad, find EGtD|AS (C : ♦≤τ t).
Consider that we fix the distribution over execution times and the suc-
cess probabilities of execution attacks, but let γ range freely among all possi-
ble probability mass functions. Thus, we have a range of possible stochastic
attackers, parameterised by γ, i.e. a range of attackers AS1,AS2 . . . , where
AS i = (A, γi, {δpa |pa ∈ Aλa}). Then we are interested in finding the attacker that
minimises the cost.
Question 6. Given an attack-defense tree t ∈ L(Aa, Ad) time limit τ , D ⊂ Ad
and a collection of attackers AS1,AS2 . . . parameterised by γ; find a stochastic
attacker, AS , minimising EGtD|AS (C : ♦≤τ t).
3 Timed Automata
In this paper we use the expressive network of timed automata (TA) formalism [1]
extensively. An efficient model checking technique exists for this formalism, and
the tool uppaal [5, 18] uses an extended version as its modelling language. As
an example consider the three automata in Fig. 4, modelling two persons and a
door.
(a) Thief (b) Resident (c) Door
Fig. 4: Model of a Thief, a Resident and a Door.
One of the persons is a Resident of a house and the other is a Thief who wants
to enter the house while the Resident is not home. The Resident is initially at
Home with the door locked for 14 hours - indicated by the expression x <= 14 .
The expression x <= 14 is an invariant expression and is something that should
always be true whenever the automata is in the given location. From Home the
resident may unlock! the door and go Outside, from where he can either Lock! the
door or just leave the location to go Away. The “U” in Outside means this location
is urgent and thus no time may pass while any automata is in such a location.
The Door is initially Locked – from here someone may request to enter?, after
which the Door responds with ok!: the “C” in the location means committed and
is similar to urgent locations, but in addition to stopping time, it also ensures
that only components in committed locations may move next. The door may
be lock?ed - from which it responds to an enter? with a nok!. The Thief chooses
some time, between 0 and 24 to attempt enter !ing – if he succeeds and gets an
ok? from the Door he is happy and enters Succ. In case he is unlucky he receives
an nok? and tries again later. Although simple, the above example contains the
key elements of timed automata. To summarise, a timed automaton consists
of locations and edges between locations. On locations one can write invariant
expressions based on the values of clocks, like x <= 14. A clock is a real-valued
counter that increases as time progresses. While moving along an edge, a TA
may synchronise with another over a set of channels: in uppaal the convention
is that a! means “send on a”, and a? means “receive on a”. Not shown in the
example is that edges can be “guarded” by expressions over clocks.
Let c be a clock then we call an element c ≤ n (c ≥ n) an upper (lower)
bound and denote by B≤(C) (B≥(C)) the set of all finite conjunctions of lower
(upper) bounds. For a finite set of channels Σ we denote by Σo = {a!|a ∈ Σ}
and Σi = {a?|a ∈ Σ} the output and input actions over Σ respectively.
Definition 4 (Timed Automaton). A timed automaton (TA) is a 6-tuple A =
(L, C, `0, A, →, I), where 1) L is a finite set of locations, 2) `0 ∈ L is the
initial location, 3) C is a finite set of clocks, 4) Σ is a finite set of chan-
nels, 5) → ⊆ L × G(C)× 2C × L is the (non-deterministic) transition relation.
We write ` g,a,R−→ `′ for a transition, where ` is the source and `′ the target location,
g ∈ B≤(C) is a guard, a ∈ Σo ∪Σi is a label, and R ⊆ C is the set of clocks to
reset, and 6) I : L → B≥(C) is an invariant function, mapping locations to a set
of invariant constraints.
A clock valuation is a function v : C → R≥0. We denote all clock valuations
over C with V(C). We need two operations on clock valuations: v ′ = v + d for a
delay of d ∈ R≥0 time units, s.t. ∀c ∈ C : v ′(c) = v(c) + d, and reset v ′ = v [R]
of a set of clocks R ⊆ C, s.t. v ′(c) = 0 if c ∈ R, and v ′(c) = v(c) otherwise. We
write v  g to mean that the clock valuation v satisfies the clock constraint g.
The semantics of a TA (L, C, `0, A, →, I) is a timed transition system with
states L×V(C) and initial state (`0, v0), where v0 assigns zero to all clocks. From
a state (`, v) the TA may transit via a discrete transition (`, v) a−→ (`′, v ′) if there
exists an edge `
g,a,r−−−→ `′, v  g and v ′ = v [r]. Time-wise the TA can perform a
delay d ∈ R≥0 via a time transition (`, v)
d−→ (`, v + d) if v + d  I(`).
Several TAs A1,A2, . . . ,An, Ai = (Li, Ci, `i0,Σ,→i, Ii) may be joined into a
network of timed automata. The state space of such a composition is the product
of the individual TAs state spaces. From a state (s1, s2, . . . , sn) the network can
do a
– discrete output transition (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
a!−→ (s′1, s′2, . . . , s′n), if there exists
an i, such that si
a!−→ s′i and for all j 6= i sj
a?−→ s′j
– or it can can delay d time units, (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
d−→ (s′1, s′2, . . . , s′n), if for all i
si
d−→ s′i.
Notice we are using broadcast synchronisation for accommodating the use of
uppaal SMC. Furthermore, we will assume that components are input-enabled
and action-deterministic thus for any action there is at most one successor and
for any input action there is at least one.
Stochastic Semantics The stochastic semantics of networks of timed automata
was laid out by David et al. [8]. In a state, each timed automaton is given a
delay density and a probability mass function for selecting output actions. The
semantics is now race based: components select a delay, t, according to their delay
distribution, and the one with the smallest delay is selected the winner. After
the entire network performs the delay, the winner selects an output according
to its probability mass function. The remaining network respond to this output
by performing the corresponding input. Afterwards a new race commences. In
uppaal SMC bounded delays (i.e. the current location has an invariant) are
selected from a uniform distribution ranging from the minimal delay before some
guard is satisfied and the maximal delay, where the invariant is still satisfied. For
unbounded delays the delay is selected from an exponential distribution.
In the preceding example, the probability that the Thief enters the house
without the Resident being home within 12 time units is:∫ 12
0
1
14
·
(∫ 24
t
1
24
dt′
)
· 1
2
·
∫ 12−t
0
1
24− t
dτ dt ≈ 0.13
Game Semantics In recent works [9, 10] the simple stochastic timed automata
model has been given a game semantics. In this semantics the edges of timed
automaton A = (L, C, `0, A, →, I) are partitioned into a controllable set of edges,
→C , and uncontrollable set of edges →U . The uncontrollable edges are controlled
by stochastic environment behaving according to the stochastic semantics above,
while the controllable set of edges is controlled by an actor that tries to “drive”
the system into a given goal state. In Fig. 4 the dashed edges correspond to
uncontrollable edges and the controllable edges are the solid edges.
A tool like Uppaal-Stratego can, by using reinforcement learning, find
deterministic strategies for minimising the expected time (or cost) of reaching a
goal - taking the stochastic environment into account.
4 Timed Automata Encoding
The timed automata encoding of the attack-defense tree semantics given in the
previous sections consists of three automata; one encoding the attacker, one
encoding the defender and one encoding the environment selecting an outcome
for the execution of attacker actions (γSucc). Furthermore, the encoding has one
boolean variable b pa per atomic proposition, p, in the attack-defense tree. The
state of these boolean variables directly corresponds to the states of the ADG.
4.1 Environmental Modelling
Fig. 5: Environmental mod-
elling. In the figure p = 1-
γSucc(pa)(pa).
Let Aa be the set of attacker actions in the attack-
defense-tree, then for each pa ∈ Aa we create
a channel c pa that is used by the attacker to
indicate that he wishes to execute pa. The envi-
ronment responds to this by deciding an outcome
in accordance with γSucc. Fig. 5 depicts the mod-
elling of the environment for an attack-defense
tree, where there is only one attacker action (pa);
here 1− p is the probability that pa succeeds.
4.2 Defender Modelling
Fig. 6: Modelling the environ-
ment with two defender ac-
tions, p1d and p
2
d.
Let Ad be the set of defender actions available
to the defender. For each D ∈ 2Ad the defender
has an edge, where he sets all boolean variables,
pd ∈ D, to true. In Fig. 6 an example modelling
of this is shown with two defender actions. As
the edges of this defender are uncontrollable, the
defender would select a set of defense measures
by a uniform choice among all the edges. For analysing possible attack scenarios
in response to a specific set of defense measures D we would delete edges of the
defender until only the edge corresponding to D remains.
4.3 Attacker Modelling
In the formal development of an attacker we just defined general requirements
that any attacker should respect. Firstly, we present a non-deterministic attacker
that is as general as possible, which can be used for learning; afterwards we
create one specific attacker profile, where the non-determinism is resolved by a
probability mass function.
Fig. 7: Non-deterministic at-
tacker modelling
Non-deterministic Attacker Assume we have Aa =
{pa} as our set of attacker actions and let each
of the attacker propositions have a lower execu-
tion bound (L pa) and an upper execution bound
(U pa) – an execution time that is not controllable
by the attacker and thus will be selected accord-
ing to a uniform distribution by the environment.
Fig. 7 depicts an attacker with only one action: from the initial state, the attacker
can decide to perform pa, if it is not already true and the tree is not already
true (!{t}); after which it enters a location, where the environment decides how
long the execution takes according to the uniform distribution. After this waiting
time the environment is informed of the attempt to execute pa and decides on
the outcome. Also, during this transition the cost of executing pa is added to the
variable i attCost. For the case with several propositions, the cycle in Fig. 7 is
added for each proposition.
In case the tree is true, the attacker only has one option, namely, to enter
the location, where he cannot do anything.
Uniform Attacker The uniform attacker is essentially the non-deterministic
attacker, where the non-determinism of selecting an action is resolved by a
uniform choice among all possible actions.
5 Tool Support
L U C F
i s 0 20 80 0.80
bs 0 20 100 0.70
t 0 20 700 0.70
b 0 20 700 0.70
st 0 20 50 0.50
ba 0 20 85 0.60
im 0 20 70 0.50
ot 0 20 0 0.60
Fig. 8: Experimental
setup.
The translation into timed automata described in the
preceding section has been implemented as a python script.
This script takes the attack-defense tree, the description
of the cost of atomic attacker actions, the execution time
and their probability of succeeding. Having translated
into timed automata, we can now take advantage of the
uppaal [5] model checking engine to answer some of the
questions raised in the previous sections. For instance,
question 3 is answerable by a simple timed reachability
check by uppaal. In the following we focus on answering
question 5 and question 6. We consider the attack-defense
tree in Fig. 1. The success probability and cost of the various attacker actions are
summarised in Fig. 8. The L column is the lower bound of the execution time, U
is the upper bound, C is the cost of the actions and F is the success probability.
5.1 Expected Cost
We first show how to answer question 5 by finding expected cost of the uniform
attacker within 300 time units. The cost of the attacker is estimated by the
uppaal SMC with the query
E[<= 300; 1000](max : i attCost).
Defenses
{
t1,tf
at,t2
} {
tf ,at
t2
} {
t1,at
t2
} {
at
t2
} {
t1,tf
t2
} {
tf
t2
} {
t1
t2
}
{t2}
{
t1,tf
at
} {
tf
at
} {
t1
at
}
{at}
{
t1
tf
}
{tf} {t1} ∅
Uniform 1030.51±33.20
873.16
±28.68
880.81
±29.0
891.17
±29.7
1027.29
±33.3
881.74
±37.7
881.68
±28.7
894.91
±37.1
867.83
±32.7
747.09
±26.82
742.3
±25.4
738.0
±26.23
7730
±31.35
659.19
±27.9
659.4
±27.1
675.6
±27.64
Uppaal-Stratego 855.86±31.6
292.76
±13.2
256.11
±6.4
256.25
±6.6
876.12
±31.4
242.62
±5.8
246.02
±5.9
267.14
±7.5
498.58
±32.3
240.22
±8.62
183.32
±7.9
197.310
±8.9
304.14
±31.1
219.13
±17.43
173.95
±8.74
115.03
±7.10
Table 1: Expected cost for the uniform attacker and for synthesised strategies.
The estimates for various defense measures are given in Table 1 in the
“Uniform” row. From the results we can see that the highest cost (unsurprisingly)
is obtained when all possible defender’s actions are selected, and the smallest
when none of them are selected. Also the results indicate that by performing
t2, t1, tf the expected cost is equivalent to performing all of the defense measures.
This is because this set jointly blocks large parts of the attack-defense tree, leaving
only the expensive “threaten” and “ blackmail” for an attacker to succeed.
5.2 Finding Good Attacker Profile
Next we answer question 6 i.e. we focus on a stochastic attacker, who minimises
his costs in response to various defense measures. For doing this, we apply the
non-deterministic attacker of our encoding and use the Uppaal-Stratego to
minimise the cost variable. The queries for the Uppaal-Stratego are
strategy s = minE(bi attCost)[<= 300] :<> t
E[<= 300; 1000](max : bi attCost) under s,
where t is the attack-defense tree translated into the uppaal syntax.
The result of executing these queries for different defenders are reported in
Table 1 in the Uppaal-Stratego row. As can be seen, the synthesized attacker
generally obtains a reduced expected cost. The reason is that he can avoid
attempting attacks he knows are blocked due to the defender’s measures. Another
reason is that this attacker actively attempts to minimise his costs; meaning he
will not take the expensive “threaten” or “bribe” if it can be avoided.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how to separate the modelling of attacker’s and
defender’s behaviours from the attack-defense tree. In this way we allow mod-
elling complex temporal behaviours without compromising the intuitively simple
description of various ways of achieving an attack expressed in the attack-defense
tree. This stands in opposition with, for example, the work [12] that adds tem-
poral behaviours by introducing sequential gates, trigger gates and reset gates,
which may clutter the description of possible attacks. Experiments reported in the
paper have shown the different analyses that can be performed on our encoding
using the uppaal SMC and Uppaal-Stratego: among these are finding an
attacker who minimises his costs, and estimating the probability of an attack for
a specific attacker.
In the future we wish to extend the current framework by describing the
actual behaviour of the attacker in a more thorough way. This may include
incorporating parts of the work by Hermanns et al. [12], but we will maintain
them in a separate modelling language.
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